members of developed industrial societies. One answer to this challenge is to document patterns across scales and to evaluate underlying mechanistic hypotheses. In essence, we suggest adopting a macroecological approach-taking a large-scale, comparative, statistical perspective to identify important patterns of variation and test for causal mechanisms (e.g., Brown 1995; Gaston & Blackburn 2000) . We define human macroecology as the study of humanenvironment interactions across spatial and temporal scales, linking small-scale interactions with large-scale, emergent patterns and their underlying processes.
In the following sections, we present selected examples to highlight some of the unique perspectives, new questions, and recent empirical and theoretical advances in human macroecology. We characterize dimensions and consequences of the human niche: interactions with the environment that affect the abundance, distribution, diversity, and social, economic, and technological development of human populations. We adopt a metabolic perspective that focuses on the exchange of energy and materials between humans and their environments and the flows, pools, and transformations of these resources into, out of, within, and among societies. We cover a wide spectrum, from how minimally acculturated hunter-gathers form social groups to forage for food, exchange information, and use space, to how modern technological societies use extra-metabolic energy, especially fossil fuels, and resource supply networks to support dense populations in large cities.
Foraging: Acquiring energy
Like other animals, humans require energy and nutrients from food to support their metabolism. Patterns and processes of food acquisition in minimally acculturated humans highlight fundamental features of the human niche. Hunting and gathering was the socio-economic framework for the vast majority of human history. The study of traditional societies offers valuable insights into human evolution and ecology, and large-scale, cross-cultural studies of variation among hunter-gatherer cultures have a venerable history in anthropology (i.e., Steward 1938; Murdoch 1967; Tindale 1974; Kelly 1995; Binford 2001 ). Despite extremely diverse diets and foraging behaviors, traditional humans search for food in broadly consistent ways. Like other social animals, such as crows, wolves, lions, and dolphins, humans usually forage in groups (Winterhalder & Smith 2000) . Foraging groups in productive environments travel shorter distances and have smaller home ranges and higher population densities than societies in less-productive cold or arid environments ( Figure 1 ) (Kelly 1995; Binford 2001 ).
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Traditional humans are also subject to constraints of trophic position and attendant energy supply. Groups that rely more on hunting animal prey and less on gathering plant foods tend to have lower population densities, occupy larger areas, and move more frequently and over greater distances (Kelly 1995) . Not surprisingly, population densities tend to be high in productive areas, such as river valleys and flood plains, and lower in unproductive high-latitude, high-elevation, and desert areas. Population densities also tend to be high where humans exploit nutrient-rich aquatic resources, such when fish and shellfish are the primary food base for populations along productive coasts and large rivers (Kelly 1995; Binford 2001) . These macroscopic foraging patterns are consistent with humans being optimal foragers who follow an "ideal free distribution" and exploit patchy resources in proportion to their energetic profitability (Sutherland 1996) .
Despite these similarities to other animals, human foragers are distinctive in three ways.
First, humans have an exceptionally wide diet breadth. For example, Ache hunter-gatherers in the Amazon Basin of Paraguay harvest at least 263 species of game (including birds, mammals, reptiles, and fish), although their hunting concentrates on the few largest, most profitable options (Kaplan et al. 2000) . Second, despite their dietary diversity humans preferentially forage for food resources that are highly profitable but rare and hard to acquire, such as large game. Aleut whalers and Ache hunters typically go for days with little or no success. The potential disadvantages of specializing on large, rare prey are offset by hunting in cooperative groups and sharing the returns, thereby reducing risk and per-capita variance in success (Winterhalder 1996) . Across a worldwide ethnographic sample, large, unpredictable food items are more likely to be shared than small, predictable ones (Gurven 2004) . Although some other primates also share food, the ubiquity of food sharing among distantly related individuals is uniquely human (Kaplan et al. 2000) . So humans tend to be optimal foragers, concentrating on food resources that provide maximal returns per unit effort, and using cooperative foraging and food sharing to increase the rate and decrease the variance in energy intake. By targeting large game, prehistoric humans contributed to size-selective extinctions of megafauna on multiple continents (Lyons et al. 2004) , while contemporary humans have hunted whales to nearextinction and skewed body size distributions of commercial fish stocks (Jennings & Reynolds 2007) . Third, humans occupy a 'high-skill' foraging niche, using skills that may take years to master and harvesting a range of foods that require sophisticated understanding of local natural history, technologies, and intensive processing techniques (Kaplan & Robson 2002) .
Developing these foraging skills requires long-term learning in social groups.
These attributes of the human foraging niche have cascading implications for human evolutionary ecology. Wide diet breadth, cooperative hunting, food sharing, and food processing allowed groups to maintain relatively dense and stable populations. The need to learn the natural history of plants and animals used for food, fiber, and medicine and the technologies used to harvest and prepare them selected for a general intelligence that emphasized memory and spatial relations as well as communication, cooperation, and planning (Kaplan & Robson 2002) . The benefits of distributing shared food resources favored the formation of social networks and selected for behaviors based on reciprocity and kinship. Given these commonalities, human social networks should converge on patterns and processes that optimize the uptake of resources from the environment and their distribution among individuals. As historic populations acquired these uniquely human traits, they spread rapidly out of their ancestral home in tropical Africa, exploiting new food resources and colonizing new environments.
Life history: Allocating energy
The energy acquired by foraging humans fuels growth, reproduction, and maintenance, or the healthy function and replacement of cells and bodily systems. That "energetic budget" is limited, as it is for all organisms, and its relative investment in these different components has consequences for an individual's fitness, meaning its genetic contribution to future generations.
The study of those decisions is called life history theory, and it provides a useful framework for addressing the duality of human ecology: those features shared with other organisms and those that are uniquely human. A life history is a "strategy," over an organism's life, for timing key events and allocating energetic resources to maintenance, growth, and reproduction (Charnov 1991; Roff 2002) . Life history 'decisions' reflect tradeoffs between when to reproduce, how long to live, how many offspring to have, and how much resources to invest in each one (Roff 2002) . Theory assumes that life histories evolve by natural selection to maximize fitness.
Energy provides a common currency and imposes tradeoffs: organisms have a finite energy budget, so, for example, energy invested in maintenance cannot be allocated to growing or producing offspring. Comparing human life history traits among societies and to those of other species illuminates how humans simultaneously obey the same laws as other organisms and where humans use technology and culture to lift some constraints in novel ways.
The macroscopic differences between the life histories of humans and those of other animals offer interesting insights. The human life history is exceptionally slow, meaning we have long lifespans, reproduce at a slow rate, and take a long time to mature. Compared to other mammals, human birth and mortality rates are low at all ages, lengthening life expectancy, juvenile period, and lifespan. Additionally, our growth rate is more similar to that of a large reptile than that of a typical mammal, as seen in Figure 2 . Theoretically, this slow growth rate should beget the slow life history (Charnov 1991) . The position of humans in Figure 1 reflects an evolutionary trend in primates toward lower size-specific growth constraints, which contributes to our long lifespans and low mortality rates (Charnov & Berrigan 1993) . Indeed, humans survive exceptionally well. Hunter-gatherers in poor environments survive better at all ages than even captive chimpanzees, our closest relative (Hill et al. 2001) . Humans are also unique in having a lifespan substantially longer than the reproductive period, so that post-reproductive females comprise a substantial fraction of huntergather as well as modern technological populations (Hawkes & Paine 2006) .
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This unique pattern of a restricted reproductive period is linked to our slow life history through sociality (Kaplan et al. 2000) . Among foraging societies, the metabolic demand of multiple dependents exceeds the foraging capacity of a single individual. Cooperative breeding and foraging supply the essential 'extra-maternal' resources (Kaplan et al. 2000; Hrdy 2006 ). In subsistence cultures, adult males forage in social groups and harvest more resources than they can consume. This 'excess' production is redistributed to other group members-to females, young, old, and unsuccessful hunters-through a complex exchange network. Nonreproductive females, including grandmothers and older children, contribute to foraging and food processing and help with child care. These contributions of males and non-reproductive females enhance the reproductive success of breeding females, increasing fecundity by shortening the time to weaning and increasing the survivorship of offspring (Marlowe 2001) .
Enhanced foraging productivity of adult males, extensive sharing of food, and social care of young are the crux of the uniquely human life history, with a long period of juvenile dependence, high offspring survival rate, and multiple dependent offspring . By supplementing the energetic budget of a family, cooperative breeding and foraging were prerequisites for the evolution of the slow human life-history pattern (Kaplan et al. 2000; Hrdy 2006 ).
Normally, the energy budget constraining an organism's life history is set by its body size.
Body size sets the metabolic rate, which in turn determines the amount of energy to be allocated to the compartments of an organism's life history (Charnov 1991 ). Yet energy use by humans is not as constrained by body size as it is for other animals, and size constraints are especially relaxed for members of contemporary, fossil-fuel driven economies. Indeed, a unique feature of human ecology is the range of energy budgets available to different human populations. The energy available to humans in fossil-fuel economies is orders of magnitude greater than the energy available to foraging populations. One must look across species that differ dramatically in size to find a range of energy budgets comparable to that within the single species of modern Homo sapiens. Grounding human life history within the frameworks of body size and metabolic growth constraints (Charnov 1991; Moses & Brown 2003) suggests the process behind this macroecological pattern.
We suggest that the key underlying life history innovation of humans is to relax the typical metabolic constraints of body size through cooperative social networks and shift this energy to an 'extra-maternal' energy budget, which is tied to a society's economic structure. Industrial economies may simply extend the life history pattern of raising multiple, "high quality" dependent offspring. Human populations fit the tradeoff between offspring quantity and offspring quality predicted by the Smith-Fretwell model: by adjusting for metabolic rate, foraging groups that produce larger offspring produce fewer offspring (Smith & Fretwell 1974; Walker et al. 2008) . In this light, the lowering of fertility with economic development, during which child rearing becomes progressively more costly, is an extension of an ancient mammalian trend. When social networks subsidizing the normal metabolic budget supply extra energy, as in developed economies, we invest that energy in hallmark primate characteristics, lowering mortality rate and investing in offspring quality over quantity.
Social networks: Distributing energy & the economics of space use
A key to understanding the unique features of human life history is to elucidate how social networks affect the rates and directions of resource flows to offspring. Humans have supplemented the direct maternal allocation common to all mammals with additional goods and services, such as food and child care, supplied by other individuals. Where do humans acquire these resources, how do they distribute them, and how do patterns of distribution affect and reflect human ecology?
Humans harvest the energetic and non-energetic resources that sustain them from ecosystems, in which they are embedded. The social organizations of these cultures are shaped by several forces. In part, they reflect the intrinsic Darwinian imperative to allocate resources to different components of the life history and to individuals of different ages and degrees of relatedness so as to maximize reproductive success. In part, they reflect extrinsic environmental constraints on resource availability.
Resource constraints are especially evident for hunter-gatherers, who must harvest all energy and material requirements for fuel, clothing, food, shelter, and non-lithic tools from populations of wild plants and animals. Hunter-gatherer cultures must contend with variation in the abundance and distribution of these biological resources in space and time. Recent studies have explored macroecological variation in the abundance, distribution, and diversity of huntergatherer cultures by applying theoretical concepts of networks, allometric scaling, and metabolic ecology (Hamilton et al. 2007a; Hamilton et al. 2007b; Hamilton et al. in press ).
Indeed, the near-universal ways in which these foraging cultures have adapted to such constraints are evident in remarkable symmetries in space use and social organization across hunter-gatherer societies worldwide.
A fundamental feature of the ecology of any organism, including humans, is how much space an individual uses on a regular basis to acquire the resources for growth, maintenance, and reproduction ). This space is termed the home range, , and defined as , where B is the metabolic rate of an individual, and R is the resource supply rate per unit area. Larger animals have higher metabolic rates and, predictably, larger home ranges. , which clearly defines the carrying capacity, K, as the filling of a territory of area A with a social group of N individuals, given their home range requirements H and their spatial organization β . Thus, the scaling exponent β has a powerful effect on the carrying capacity (Hamilton et al. in press) .
Across a global sample of 339 hunter-gatherer societies, the space required by an individual decreases with population size in traditional human societies. As shown in Figure 3 , 1 β < and close to ¾ , suggesting an economy of scale (Hamilton et al. 2007a ). As such, individual space requirements decrease with increasing population size at a rate .
However, because individual resource requirements are constant, the resource supply rate per unit area, R, increases with population size, as
Larger populations are able to extract more resources per unit area of their territory, allowing smaller exclusive home ranges or increasing overlap among shared home ranges. As a consequence of these economies of scale, carrying capacities of the largest human populations in this sample are about five times higher than expected if individual space requirements were fixed so that group territory size just scaled up linearly with population size. Put simply, large hunter-gather societies tend to use their environments more efficiently than small societies, extracting more resources per unit area.
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From sedentary coastal fishing societies to nomadic desert bands, hunter-gatherer cultures worldwide also show remarkable similarities in social organization despite large differences in food base and habitat (Hamilton et al. 2007b) . Self-recognized regional populations typically include about 1000 individuals organized into a nested hierarchy of modular group sizes, from individual nuclear family units, to seasonal residential groups, up to the regional population.
Moreover, the nesting of these subgroups within higher order groups is statistically self-similar.
The average ratio between organizational levels is about 4, hypothesized to reflect the average size of a nuclear family (two parents and two offspring) in a non-growing population ( Figure   3b ). The topology of such social networks bears remarkable similarity to many other fractal-like complex systems. Interestingly, nested, self-similar social structures seem common to a range of non-human social species as well (Hill et al. 2008 ).
The existence of such symmetries across cultures that vary widely in their environmental circumstances suggests universal processes underlying how politically egalitarian huntergatherer cultures self-organize (Hamilton et al. 2007b) . We posit that the consistently fractallike structure of traditional human societies serves to maximize the flux of energy, materials, and information through social networks. Similar physical constraints and optimization principles underlie the fractal-like networks of animal societies, plant architectures, stream networks, and the human vascular system (Brown et al. 2002; Hill et al. 2008 ).
Human disease: Distributing, encountering, and promoting infection
As societies grow, their ramifying social networks carry more than energy, materials, and information. Parasites and pathogens move among people, and larger social networks can spread these scourges further and often faster. As larger populations typically occupy smaller territories, exposure to infected individuals may rise with society size as well.
"Disease ecology" is a vibrant and important field with a large and rapidly growing literature (e.g. Jones et al. 2008 ; Smith et al. 2007; Guernier et al. 2004) . Many studies examine spatial and temporal dynamics of specific diseases and macroparasites in an ecological context (e.g. Grenfell & Bolker 1998) . Others are primarily theoretical and adapt mathematical models from epidemiology and ecology to address the origin, spread, and dynamics of diseases (e.g. Anderson & May 1991) . Here we take a macroecological approach to human disease and highlight where such a perspective might be especially informative. We focus on the ecology of humans as hosts, the ecology of human parasites and pathogens, and the implications of global change.
As hosts, humans display three important macroscopic patterns: i) humans spread geographically and take along some parasites and pathogens; ii) as humans colonize new areas, they encounter new organisms, including new pathogens, new parasites, and new alternative hosts for existing pathogens and parasites; and iii) as agriculture and industrialization increased human population movements and population density, they drastically altered disease ecology.
Anatomically modern humans migrated out of Africa, and spread across Eurasia, Australia, and the Americas. As humans colonized temperate latitudes, they left behind many tropical diseases but brought along others, such as cholera (Lafferty 2009 ). More recently, migrating Eurasian populations spread these diseases to previously unexposed populations, causing devastating epidemics. As population density increased with increasing agriculture and urbanization, the number and frequency of diseases increased as new emerging pathogens switched from wild and domesticated animals to humans, and as vectors such as mosquitoes and fleas transmitted pathogens between denser and more frequently infected hosts (Wolfe et al. 2007; Barrett et al. 1998 ).
Relatively recent changes in human macroecology affect our role as hosts. As longdistance travel and trade networks have expanded, parasites and pathogens have crossed previously impermeable biogeographic barriers. Rising population densities have fostered the geographic spread of "crowd-epidemic diseases" such as influenza and SARS (Wolfe et al. 2007 ). In just the last thirty years, increased contact between humans and wild, commensal, and domesticated animals due to ecological and social changes has increased the temporal frequency and spatial scale of such "zoonotic diseases" (Wilcox & Gubler 2005) . Although advances in nutrition, public health, and medicine have generally extended average lifespans, the coevolutionary race between contemporary humans and our enemies continues unabated and is a major public health concern (Barrett et al. 1998; McMichael 2004) .
Human parasites and infectious pathogens also display macroecological patterns, which offer novel insights into disease ecology. First, there is a latitudinal gradient in the diversity of human disease organisms, similar to the diversity gradients in animals, plants, and microbes.
There are more diseases in the tropics than at higher latitudes, as shown in Fig. 4 (Guernier et al. 2004) . Additionally, 'communities' of pathogens form nested subsets, so that humans living at progressively higher latitudes tend to be infected with only a subset of the parasites and pathogens that cause diseases in the tropics, as illustrated in Fig 4b ( Guernier et al. 2004) .
Interestingly, only vector-borne parasites of primates, apparently not viral diseases and helminth parasites, are also more diverse toward the tropics (Nunn et al. 2005) .
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Second, actual infections exhibit nested hierarchies. Across gradients of population density, epidemics display "hierarchies of infection," with infections concentrated and outbreaks lasting longer in large cities (Grenfell & Bolker 1998) . Models that represent human population structure as nested hierarchies of subpopulations (see above) and that incorporate realistic movements of individuals, including both small-scale movements, such as to and from work, and large-scale movements, such as international travel, capture the heterogeneous characteristics and temporal dynamics of real epidemics (e.g. Watts et al. 2005; Viboud et al. 2006 ). Third, geographic and temporal patterns of disease depend on host specificity. Many human-only pathogens are globally distributed, whereas most zoonotic pathogens are regionally or even locally restricted (Smith et al. 2007) . New emerging infectious diseases are mostly zoonotic, but most of these do not become epidemic (Jones et al. 2008) .
All three of these macroecological patterns of human disease-latitudinal gradients, nested hierarchies, and their joint dependence on host specificity-reflect basic ecological processes.
The latitudinal gradient of pathogen diversity is strongly correlated with climatic variables, including both temperature and precipitation (Guernier et al. 2004) . Warm, moist conditions are conducive to the survival and spread of diverse species of pathogens, parasites, vectors, and reservoir hosts. Diversity begets diversity as higher temperatures spur higher rates of pathogenhost interactions and Red Queen coevolution. The nestedness patterns likely reflect the filtering effects of increasingly stressful climates and decreasing biodiversity on parasite, pathogen, and vector diversity away from the equator. The difference in the geographic distributions and epidemic dynamics between human-only and zoonotic diseases (Fig. 5 ) undoubtedly reflects the differences in the abundance and distribution of Homo sapiens compared to the animal species that serve as sources and reservoirs for diseases. Although Homo sapiens has a population approaching 7 billion and a truly cosmopolitan distribution, most of the animals that harbor zoonotics are rare or geographically restricted.
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Macroecology can help us understand the effects of global change on human disease as well. By helping develop quantitative predictions of abundance and distribution, macroecology complements "the frequently local focus of global change biology." (Kerr et al. 2007 ) For example, a macroecological approach and metabolic perspective underlie studies on impacts of climate on species richness patterns in a variety of taxa. WHO estimates that 6-7% of the incidence of malaria in some regions is due to recent climate change (McMichael et al. 2004 ).
Other human parasites, pathogens, and vectors will shift their ranges with rising temperatures and shifting precipitation and drought patterns, changes well suited to macroecological study.
One feature of human-caused global change is biotic homogenization (Kerr et al. 2007 ). We expect that diseases, too, will become more homogenized and cosmopolitan as parasites, pathogens, and vectors expand their ranges. Macroecological perspectives that address such problems of variation and scale should help us tackle these and other pressing questions of human disease ecology (Pascual & Bouma 2009 ).
Cultural and linguistic diversity: Separating along familiar lines
Perhaps more striking than the similarities between diversity gradients of human disease organisms and species generally are similar patterns among indigenous human cultures and languages. Recent studies have documented a latitudinal gradient in the diversity of aboriginal cultures and languages (e.g., Mace & Pagel 1995; Nettle 1998; Cashdan 2001; Collard & Foley 2002; Moore et al. 2002) . At least coarsely, the pattern mirrors species diversity of animals, plants, parasites, and pathogens, being highest in topographically diverse regions in the tropics, such as New Guinea, southern Asia, equatorial Africa, and Mesoamerica, and lowest in polar and desert regions ( Figure 6 ).
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Three features of this macroscopic pattern are particularly interesting. First, human cultures generally occupy non-overlapping ranges (Nettle 1998) , so the pattern is expressed in terms of cultural density or tribal territories rather than as number of sympatric taxa, as for animal and plant species. Second, the patterns have been established rapidly -since Homo sapiens expanded out of Africa about 50,000 years ago, and since they colonized the New World about 15,000 years ago (Collard & Foley 2002) . Indeed, time since settlement "has surprisingly little effect on language diversity" (Sutherland 2003) . Cultural and linguistic diversity gradients are also strikingly similar to gradients of human-dispersed exotic plants and animals, many of which were established within just the last few centuries (Sax 2001) . Third, as would be expected from the similar geographic patterns, cultural diversity and species diversity are correlated with similar environmental variables: both are high in regions with high temperature, rainfall, topographic relief, and habitat diversity (e.g., for cultural diversity Nettle 1998; Cashdan 2001; for species diversity Hawkins et al. 2003) .
Are the similar patterns of cultural diversity and biodiversity generated by similar mechanistic processes? Two points seem particularly relevant. First, both cultural diversification and biological diversification are the result of a balance between coalescent processes that tend to keep a population together and disruptive processes that tend to break populations apart and isolate them. Second, the same environmental variables operating in similar ways are likely to determine the balance between cohesive and divisive forces for both cultures and species. For example, human cultural diversity and mammal species diversity exhibit quantitatively similar exponential relationships with environmental temperature (A.P. Allen & J.H. Brown unpublished data). The rapid establishment and repeated, independent formation of similar latitudinal diversity gradients of human cultures and biological species on multiple continents suggest that the primary causes at continental and global scales are ecological, though cultural phylogenetic history and sociopolitical factors, such as empire formation, surely play major roles at regional scales.
Three classes of ecological mechanisms may strongly affect these gradients: 1) environmental heterogeneity, due to temporal variation in weather and climate and spatial variation in topography, geology, and soil; 2) biotic productivity, due to spatial variation in rates of energy, water, and nutrient supply, and 3) Red Queen kinetics, due to spatial variation in temperature, which affects rates of metabolism, ecological interactions, and evolution and coevolution with parasites and pathogens.
Empirical evidence and theory suggest that all three mechanisms, which are not mutually exclusive, may contribute to these similar patterns. As noted, both cultural and biological diversity are highest in mountainous regions of the tropics and semitropics (Cashdan 2001) . At least two processes may contribute to this pattern. First, the occurrence of dramatically different environments in close proximity promotes differentiation based on specialization. For both cultures and species, spatial heterogeneity in abiotic conditions, habitat types, and ecological communities leads to the origin and cohesion of specialized local populations better able to tolerate the physiological stress, use the resources, and avoid the predators, parasites, and diseases in the distinctive local environments. Second, topographic relief and complex landscapes tend to create isolated and patchy environments, which also have divisive effects, creating barriers, reducing migration, and promoting development of specialized populations.
Both cultural and biological diversity also tend to be high in regions of high net primary productivity, so where rates of supply of usable energy and other resources are high and relatively constant (Nettle 1998 , Hawkins et al. 2003 , Field et al. 2008 . All things being equal, more-productive environments can support more individuals per unit area. Assuming some minimum viable population size required to avoid extinction due to demographic and environmental stochasticity, more individuals can aggregate into more populations with smaller ranges, promoting greater biological and cultural diversity (Moore et al. 2002) . For humans, more-productive areas also tend to have longer growing seasons, reducing variation in food supplies across the seasons and facilitating the formation of small, sedentary, specialized cultural and linguistic groups (Nettle 1998; Smith 2001) .
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Finally, cultural diversity tends to increase exponentially with environmental temperature, just like species diversity (Figure 7 ). This pattern is consistent with the explanation that metabolic rates increase exponentially with temperature. In warmer climates, higher metabolic rates in plants and ectotherms, including parasites, pathogens, and invertebrate vectors, increase rates of ecological interactions and coevolutionary processes that contribute to the origin and maintenance of species diversity generally (Rohde 1992; Allen et al. 2002) . Higher local species richness may affect cultural and linguistic diversity several ways. Traditional human societies have specialized vocabularies for local plants, animals, parasites, and diseases; specialized technologies and customs for food capture and processing; and specialized plant and fungal pharmacopeias. (Berlin 1992) . In essence, indigenous cultures "map on" to local biodiversity, and as that biodiversity rises with temperature, the number of differentiated cultures may rise in 
Industrial metabolism: Using energy in modern times
Humans evolved as hunter-gatherers, and we have seen how this ancestral context shaped macroecological patterns of cultural diversity, infectious disease, population structure, space use, and life history. In just the last 10,000 years, however, the agricultural, industrial, and technological revolutions have lifted many socioeconomic constraints. These revolutions were possible because humans 'learned' to harness non-metabolic energy, first wood and dung and now primarily fossil fuels. Human biological metabolism is about 100W, that of an ordinary mammal of our size. But people use much more energy than their bodies require, from about 300W in hunter-gatherer societies to 11,000W in the most developed nations (Moses & Brown 2003; WRI 2009 ). Among hunter-gatherers, this energy comes from burning biofuels such as wood and dung. Agricultural societies burn biofuels and use animal labor. The 'metabolism' of contemporary industrial societies are fueled by oil, coal, natural gas, and nuclear, solar and hydroelectric power. The average U.S citizen uses more than 100 times more energy than his or her biological metabolism.
Does the non-metabolic energy use of people in contemporary societies affect their life history? In animals, the metabolic rate drives and constrains the life history, because all biological activity is ultimately constrained by the rate an organism acquires and transforms energy ). Indeed, Moses & Brown (2003) found that reproductive rates are negatively correlated with per capita energy use across modern nations ( Humans and other primates have slower life histories and lower fecundities than other mammals. The relationship between fertility rate and rate of per-capita energy use across modern nations appears to simply extend the relationship between reproductive rate and metabolic rate in primates. The total energy use from fossil fuels and other sources for a female in the U.S. today is the energy that would be required by a hypothetical 30,000 kg primate, and the average U.S. female's lifetime fertility rate is that predicted for a primate this size. This qualitative relationship between fertility and economic development is well known to social scientists as part of the "demographic transition." The metabolic perspective of macroecology provides a quantitative explanation for the drop in fertility with economic development based on life history theory.
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Why does human fertility drop with societal energy use? Given the analogy of industrial metabolism with biological metabolism, consider how a contemporary society is like a whole organism. Both require energy and resources, which in both cases are delivered through networks. Biological metabolism is fueled by sugars and micronutrients delivered by vascular networks. Modern 'industrial metabolism' is fueled by oil, coal, natural gas, and nuclear, solar and hydroelectric power. Fuels and electricity are delivered by physical networks of pipe lines, power grids, roads, rail roads, and shipping and air traffic lanes. Recent work linking vascular networks and size in organisms may underlie these similarities and tie them to the life history variable of fertility rate.
A theory for why metabolic rate scales sublinearly with body mass (M), i.e., as 4 / 3 M rather than linearly as M 1 , is based on the observation that larger bodies have larger networks that can deliver resources at a faster rate, but not in direct proportion to their larger size. As more branches are added to a network, the network transports materials over greater distances, taking more time and requiring progressively more infrastructure. Therefore, the rate of supply of resources to cells does not keep pace, so the mass-specific metabolic rate must decrease with increasing body size (West et al. 1997) . As metabolic rate falls so does fertility rate: larger organisms, with higher metabolisms, have fewer offspring. This theory illustrates two key features of biological energetics: i) diminishing returns, so that a large organism uses proportionately less energy than a small one; and ii) economies of scale, so that a large organism requires a lower rate of energy supply per unit mass than a small organism.
We hypothesize that industrial networks are similar to biological networks in two respects.
First, modern industrial networks exhibit diminishing returns in that investment in infrastructure increases faster than the energetic return on those investments. Second, per capita industrial metabolism both drives and constrains many activities in modern human societies, including the activities of the individual people that consume resources from these networks (Moses 2009 ).
Slight but distinguishable diminishing returns are evident in the scaling of U.S. urban road networks (Samaniego & Moses 2008) . The per-capita distance driven in "U.S. Metropolitan
Statistical Areas" increases with city size, but less so than expected for two reasons. First, population density tends to increase with metro area. Packing more people into a smaller area is an economy of scale that does not occur in organisms, where cell density does not change with body size. Second, unlike a vascular network where all blood flows out from a heart, some urban transport is decentralized -commuting to a local grocery store or gasoline station does not require driving through the city centre. To varying degrees, "city morphology is a nested hierarchy of subcenters or clusters across many scales, from neighborhoods to the entire metropolitan area, organized around key economic functions" (Batty 2008 ).
An economy of scale is evident in the relationship between per capita energy use and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across nations. GDP is the total value of all goods and services exchanged in one year, in this case expressed in terms of $US per capita. Like the scaling of metabolic rate, this relationship is sublinear, as shown in Fig. 9 (data from WRI 2009). As national economies grow and consume more energy, individuals use proportionately less energy for every additional dollar of economic activity.
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The relationship between individual energy use and societal economic growth exemplifies the difficulty of distinguishing economies of scale from decreasing returns. Just as proportionately less energy is needed to fuel rising economic growth, proportionately more money must be spent to produce each additional unit of energy. Clearly there are feedbacks between energy consumption and economic activity-money must be spent to extract resources (diminishing returns), but extracting resources generates economic activity (increasing returns.)
The trend of decreasing individual energy use with economic growth recalls similar patterns we have seen, including the economy of scale seen in the metabolism of organisms, where less energy is used per cell as body size increases. Tellingly, the scaling of energy use and economic activity in contemporary industrialized societies also recalls the economy of scale in space use with increasing population size in hunter gather societies. Industrial networks are effectively modern extensions of traditional social networks, which enable people to extract and transport astronomically more resources and live at much higher population densities, but with the cost of an even slower life history, characterized by still lower fertility. Put simply, the more energy required to raise a child to be "competitive," the fewer children families tend to have.
Urban systems: Concentrating people, energy, and innovation
Throughout most of human history, societies were small and social relationships were based largely on kinship networks. The development of industrial networks accentuated existing patterns while altering the socioeconomic basis of human existence. The human population has since exploded, increasing technological and economic development and attendant resource use on a staggering scale. What put humans on this path of ever-increasing exponential population and economic growth?
During the Paleolithic, rising population densities and attendant economic stresses promoted and accelerated cultural and technological evolution (Stiner et al. 1999; Kuhn & Stiner 1998) . Similar dynamics are now at play at an unprecedented pace. Driving this pattern is the close connection between larger human populations, concentration of people in cities, and an increasing pace of innovation, which gives access to more natural resources and fuels the positive feedbacks (Bettencourt et al. 2007a (Bettencourt et al. , 2009 ).
Cities highlight three conflicting trends driving human demands on ecological systems (Bettencourt et al. 2007a) . First, cities concentrate people in smaller land areas, allowing economies of scale in infrastructure and social services. So, for example, use of gas and electricity scales sublinearly with population size. As these efficiencies of scale are exploited, urban populations may have a smaller ecological footprint per capita, in terms of space and resource consumption, than the same population at a lower density. Second, urbanization spurs increased innovation, wealth creation, and attendant resource consumption (Romer 1986; Krugman 1991) . As shown in Figure 10 , average income rises superlinearly, so that a doubling of urban population size raises the average income of the city's citizens by 10-20 % (Bettencourt et al. 2007a, b) . The number of people in "supercreative" jobs grows superlinearly too, as artists, entrepreneurs, companies, and universities spur innovation. Given the economic calculus of urban life, it is not surprising that cities emerged in similar form time and again in human history (Krugman 1991) . On the flip side, social ills such as incidences of violent crime and the spread of infectious disease also increase superlinearly with population density.
[Fig 10]
These social changes accompany the "demographic transition" characteristic of economic development, the decrease in both birth rates and death rates seen most notably in cities (see above and Mace 2008) . Thus, population concentration affects the balance between the biological and human facets of our dual nature, enhancing sociocultural prerogatives while affecting basic life history parameters.
Two remarkable and universal features of human societies follow from these macroecological relationships. First, because socioeconomic quantities are rates (e.g. wages earned/person/year), their relative increase accelerates the pace of society (Bettencourt et al. 2007a) . As a city grows, wealth creation, innovation, and other rhythms of social behavior rise ever faster. Even the average pace that people walk increases with urban population. In essence, cities act as social accelerators. Second, because the relationships are self-similar, there are no characteristic scales at which they change qualitatively. Instead, the phenomena are power-law functions of city population size, rising superlinearly as long as urban populations grow.
There are no theoretical limits to such increasing returns with urban population size (Romer 1986; Bettencourt et al. 2007a) . Ecologists are familiar with growth curves that follow logistic shapes, reaching an asymptote at some environmental carrying capacity that constrains future population growth. However, human societies, and cities in particular, have often evaded resource constraints through continual innovation (Mumford 1961) . So long as the increasing returns to scale feed back to sustain larger urban populations, then population growth will accelerate indefinitely as population size increases.
In reality, external perturbations or internal disruptions tend to periodically slow growth, resulting in punctuated, ever-shorter cycles. If a population grows faster than it can innovate or adapt to environmental change, then it can quickly collapse. Indeed, historians and archaeologists have documented multiple catastrophic declines and disappearances of cities and even entire societies (e.g. Tainter 1988) . So there are exceptions to the pattern of accelerating growth, as due to reductions in food and water supply or to outbreaks of violence and disease.
Study of these cases will suggest when and why the pace of innovation was unable to keep up with the pace of growth and demand.
Given the Earth's finite resources and the tendency for feedbacks to increase the frequency of cyclical crises, population growth fueled by increasing returns is never stable. 
Conclusion
The dual nature of H. sapiens is probably why most ecologists have shied away from studying our own species. What can the study of humans teach us about ecological pattern and process, and how can ideas and models developed for understanding "pristine" environments and native taxa teach us about our own self-reflective, culturally endowed species?
As illustrated by the examples above, macroecological analyses reveal pervasive patterns, and metabolic theory suggests testable mechanistic hypotheses. Knowledge of the past is essential to understand the present. Macroecological studies of minimally acculturated huntergathers teach us about the environmental relationships that shaped human evolution.
Understanding of the present is essential to predict the future. with its greater land area, than in the southern hemisphere. B) In both hemispheres, the disease organisms present at higher latitudes comprise subsets of the larger variety found at lower latitudes.
(after Guernier et al. 2004 ).
Fig 5: A plot, on logarithmic axes, of number of infectious agents as a function of territory area of nations for three host categories: human-only, zoonotic (resident in native animals with occasional outbreaks in humans), and multi-host (life history includes a stage that infects a non-human host). The invariant human-specific pattern implies that diseases with direct human-to-human transmission are cosmopolitan, whereas the positive species-area relationships in the other categories show that agents that depend on non-human hosts are more restricted geographically (after Smith et al. 2007 ). government. b) The number of people employed in "supercreative" jobs, such as artists, architects, scientists, and engineers, also rises faster than population. Data are plotted on logarithmic axes and exponents, β, and R
